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THE DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN VENEZUELA AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
FTAA PROCESS
Charles H. Blake*
N late 1994, Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera participated in the
first Summit of the Americas in Miami, Florida. Although Caldera
had criticized some aspects of market-oriented economics during his
successful 1993 election campaign, the Venezuelan delegation backed the
integration initiative central to the Miami summit. In December 1994,
along with all thirty-three heads of state in attendance, Caldera signed
the Miami Declaration endorsing the negotiation of the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA):
We, therefore, resolve to begin immediately to construct the
[FTAA], in which barriers to trade and investment will be progres-
sively eliminated. We further resolve to conclude the negotiation of
the [FTAA] no later than 2005, and agree that concrete progress to-
ward the attainment of this objective will be made by the end of this
century.1
Furthermore, during the second half of his presidential term, the Cal-
dera government pursued several market-oriented reforms as part of the
Venezuelan Agenda program formed in the wake of an International
Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement signed in July 1996.
Although Caldera's successor, President Hugo Chdvez, signed the 2001
Quebec City Declaration stemming from the third Summit of the Ameri-
cas, Venezuela was the only country in the hemisphere to express written
reservations regarding its potential support for the FTAA. In late 2005,
Chivez participated in the fourth Summit of the Americas in Mar del
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1. Miami Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Principles (1994), http://www.
summit-americas.org/miamidec.htm.
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Plata, Argentina. In November 2005, along with the presidents of Argen-
tina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, Chivez insisted that the Declaration
of Mar del Plata include the following minority report in paragraph
nineteen regarding the negotiation of the FTAA:
Other member states maintain that the necessary conditions are not
yet in place for achieving a balanced and equitable free trade agree-
ment with effective access to markets free from subsidies and trade-
distorting practices, and that takes into account the needs and sensi-
tivities of all partners, as well as the differences in the levels of devel-
opment and size of the economies.
2
Furthermore, during the two years that followed the Mar del Plata
summit, Chivez spoke increasingly of a transition in Venezuela toward
"twenty-first century socialism" and of a Alternativa Bolivariana para los
Pueblos de Nuestra Am~rica (ALBA) [Bolivarian Alternative for the
Peoples of Our America] in which like-minded countries could join Vene-
zuela in refusing to participate in the FTAA process. Chdvez asserted
that the FTAA was an extension of the U.S. empire in the Americas.
The prior two paragraphs illustrate a dramatic swing in Venezuela.
Government support for much of the Washington Consensus agenda in
the 1990s transformed to frontal opposition to that agenda by the early
twenty-first century. In some respects, Venezuela's evolution on these
matters is simply a more exaggerated version of political and policy sw-
ings observed elsewhere in Latin America over the past two decades.
But, the Venezuelan experience takes on added significance because of
Hugo Chdivez's high-profile efforts to assist (and lead) critics of capital-
ism and critics of free trade with the United States. Chdivez and Fidel
Castro formally launched the call for ALBA as an alternative to the
FTAA in December 2004. In 2005, Chdvez began to talk about the
"death" of the FfAA and about his plans to go the Mar del Plata summit
to "bury" the FTAA. At the Third Summit of the Peoples, held concur-
rently in Mar del Plata with the fourth presidential Summit of the Ameri-
cas, Chivez told those in attendance, "With banners held high in honor of
Martf, San Martfn, and Bolivar [the principal heroes of the Cuban, Ar-
gentine, and Venezuelan independence movements, respectively] we are
going to bury capitalism in order to give birth to twenty-first-century
socialism." 3
What do the dynamics of Venezuelan political economy tell us about
the future of hemispheric integration? This study will shed light on these
issues by examining economic reform in Venezuela with an emphasis on
its implications for regional integration. The first section reviews the
evolution of Venezuelan economic policy from the restoration of democ-
2. Fourth Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Mar del Plata (2005), http://www.
summit-americas.org/Eng-2004/previous-summits.htm (follow hyperlink below
"Declaration of Mar del Plata").
3. Dario Palavecino, Chdvez decret6 "la tumba del ALCA" en un marat6nico dis-
curso, LA NACION, Nov. 5, 2005, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/
nota.asp?nota-id=753843.
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racy in 1958 through the December 2007 referendum on constitutional
reform initiated by Hugo Chivez and his supporters. The second section
examines contemporary Venezuelan foreign economic policies, highlight-
ing the tensions residing in the simultaneous pursuit of traditional sub-
regional agreements and the recent efforts to create an ALBA bloc of
hemispheric partners. The concluding section examines public opinion
data in Venezuela (and elsewhere in Latin America) to develop recom-
mendations for reinvigorating the FTAA process. From a broader re-
gional perspective, the addition of a regional development fund to the
draft FTAA accord would improve the prospects for an enduring hemi-
spheric integration agreement.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF MARKET-ORIENTED
POLICIES IN VENEZUELA
From the middle of the twentieth century forward into the 1970s, Vene-
zuelan economic policy was primarily and increasingly statist. Unlike the
rise of statism in most Latin American countries, however, this expansion
of the public sector was driven by oil revenues. With the discovery and
exploitation of oil in the Lake Maracaibo area, Venezuela became the
world's largest oil producer in the 1920s. Although discoveries in some
Middle Eastern countries during ensuing decades would exceed those
made in the Maracaibo basin, Venezuela has remained a major oil ex-
porter for nearly a century. Oil revenues have thus constituted a central
driver of the fiscal prospects for state capitalist economic policies in
Venezuela. 4
A. THE EMERGENCE OF STATE CAPITALISM (1958-1978)
On January 23, 1958, a military coup set into motion the second major
attempt to establish a democracy in Venezuela. The first such effort dur-
ing the years 1945-1948, known as the trienio [three-year era] in Venezue-
lan political history, had generated considerable political polarization
between the electoral majority of the center-left Acci6n Democrdtica
(AD) [Democratic Action] party and those opposed to the redistributive
policies favored by AD. Tensions in the 1940s culminated in a military
coup backed by the major center-right Comit de Organizaci6n Polftica
Electoral Independiente (COPEI) [a Christian Democratic party].
During the years 1958-1964, the AD leadership wanted to avoid the
political polarization of the 1940s. In 1958, leaders of the three major
parties, AD, COPEI, and the Uni6n Republicana Democrdtica (URD)
[Democratic Republican Union], met to discuss backing a national unity
candidate for the presidency. While they could not agree on such a candi-
date, they did reach a pivotal agreement, the Pact of Punto Fijo. Each
4. Much of the material in this section is a revised and updated treatment based on
CHARLES H. BLAKE, POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 361-99 (Houghton Mifflin, 2d
ed. 2008).
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party would accept the outcome of the elections and participate in a coa-
lition cabinet. In particular, the pact forged a centrist, programmatic con-
sensus between AD and its main electoral rival, COPEI. AD would not
push for as many socioeconomic reforms as it had in the 1940s, and
COPEI would not oppose the more modest reform pursued in the late
1950s and early 1960s.
The Pact of Punto Fijo represented an about-face for Venezuelan party
politics both in tone and in regard to economic policy. The shared experi-
ence of repression and exile during the 1950s reconciled the bitter adver-
saries of the trienio, AD, and COPEI. This search for consensus carried
over into the coalition cabinet formed by AD founder R6mulo
Betancourt (who won the 1958 presidential elections with 49 percent of
the vote). Betancourt argued that increasing taxes on foreign-owned oil
companies could fund increased spending on all government priorities.
To mend fences with business interests, the Betancourt government tried
to negotiate wage hikes while preventing strikes. The new government
revenues from oil funded subsidies for industrial promotion (as well as
for education and health spending hikes). Public spending also increased
to two prior sources of opposition to AD, the armed forces and the Cath-
olic Church.
After Betancourt's term, AD and COPEI leaders did not renew their
coalition cabinet. However, both political parties retained the centrist ec-
onomic platforms they had developed during the Pact of Punto Fijo.
They both backed state capitalist policies calling for oil revenues to fi-
nance import-substituting industrialization (ISI). Both parties also sup-
ported increases in social spending. By 1968 the Venezuelan government
spent more per person on education and health care than did other Latin
American governments. COPEI's founder, Rafael Caldera, won a tightly
contested four-candidate race for the presidency in 1968, with 29 percent
of the vote. Caldera called for an extension of many policies pursued by
two prior AD presidents. State capitalism had become Venezuela's eco-
nomic approach.5 By raising taxes on the oil sector, AD and COPEI
could spend more on nearly all areas of government activity without rais-
ing tax rates on individual Venezuelans. Oil companies paid the Vene-
zuelan government under two-fifths of their total production in taxes and
royalties in 1959 at the start of the new democracy. 6 By 1973, their pay-
ments to the government comprised nearly two-thirds of their
production.7
5. For more on Venezuelan economic policy and economic performance from the
1950s through the Caldera government, see James Hanson, Cycles of Economic
Growth and Structural Change Since 1950, in VENEZUELA: THE DEMOCRATIC Ex-
PERIENCE X, 64-89 (John D. Martz & David J. Myers eds., 1977).
6. See FRANKLIN TUGWELL, THE POLTICS OF OIL IN VENEZUELA (1975); Franklin
Tugwell, Petroleum Policy and the Political Process, in VENEZUELA: THE DEMO-
CRAnC EXPERIENCE 64-89 (John D. Martz & David J. Myers eds., 1977).
7. See TUGWELL, THE POLITrCS OF OIL IN VENEZUELA supra note 6; Tugwell, Petro-
leum Policy and the Political Process, supra note 6.
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Carlos Andrds Perez assumed the presidency in March 1974, six
months after the first oil price hike pursued by the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As a result, Venezuela's considera-
ble oil reserves quadrupled in value. The avalanche of new fiscal
resources produced a massive increase in spending on nearly all fronts.
Government subsidies reduced the cost of many foodstuffs and other
consumer goods. Also, government spending on education and health
care increased further. In addition, the Venezuelan Investment Fund de-
cided to share a portion of the oil windfall with neighboring countries
through grants and low-interest loans to Andean, Caribbean, and Central
American countries.
Numerous substantive changes occurred as a part of the expansion of
state capitalist development plans. The government launched many new
state-owned manufacturing firms. The government formed the Venezue-
lan Corporation of Guyana to manage ambitious investments in steel,
aluminum, and hydroelectric power. The P6rez government also used oil
wealth to nationalize several existing firms. In January 1975, the govern-
ment purchased the two major U.S.-owned iron-ore mines for over $100
million. In August 1975, the government created a publicly owned hold-
ing company, Petr6leos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) [Venezuelan Petro-
leum Incorporated], to purchase the fourteen existing foreign-owned oil
companies for roughly $1 billion. In both cases, the former owners re-
ceived lucrative contracts to provide technical and managerial assistance
to the newly nationalized enterprises.
Venezuela also had enjoyed some enviable economic outcomes during
the 1960s and 1970s. Poverty rates fell slightly and GDP per capita rose
considerably. Perez's presidency during the 1970s marked the height of
Venezuela's development ambitions and the economy grew at an annual
rate of 6 percent.8
While most Latin American countries endured military dictatorships in
the 1970s, Venezuela received regional and international praise as a
model democracy. Most citizens supported one of the two major parties,
AD or COPEI. Some analysts asked whether Venezuela's democratic ex-
ceptionalism during this period contained lessons for other countries.
Others countered that Venezuela's success in maintaining democratic rule
had been fueled primarily by oil.9 Despite their disagreements, both
8. UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean [ECLAC],
CEPALSTAT online database, http://www.eclac.org/estadisticasfbases/default.asp?
idioma=in (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
9. See TUGWELL, THE POLITICS OF OIL IN VENEZUELA, supra note 6; TERRY LYNN
KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS AND PETRO-STATES 219 (1986).
Karl acknowledged that oil alone did not forge what she called Venezuela's
"pacted democracy" as political leadership also played a role. Nonetheless, she
emphasized the vulnerability of any oil-rich state. In the spoils system used for
divvying up oil wealth, political actors focus on increasing and retaining their re-
spective shares of easy money rather than on improving the efficiency of public
and private sector activity. Karl concluded (p. 219) that "the long-term viability of
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sides of this debate saw the Venezuelan political system as enviably
stable.
B. THE CRISIS OF STATE CAPITALISM (1979-1988)
Inside Venezuela and beyond, some already questioned the sus-
tainability of the economic approach employed during the mid-1970s. By
the end of P6rez's term, total public employment had doubled. Amid the
rapid expansion, corruption scandals proliferated regarding padded con-
tracts for the construction of public facilities, kickbacks paid to gain pub-
lic contracts, and ghost employees who were kept on the public payroll
while doing little or no work. COPEI candidate Luis Herrera won the
1978 presidential campaign by promising to impose limits on this free-
spending approach.
After a short-lived doubling of oil prices in 1979-1980, Venezuela's ec-
onomic fortunes took a turn for the worse. A world recession in the early
1980s, along with sharp declines in oil prices in 1982 and in 1986, sent
shock waves throughout the country. Since two-thirds of government
revenues (and the pace of economic activity more generally) depended
on oil revenues, the Venezuelan economy found itself with a rising for-
eign debt and a stagnating economy. Amid the crisis, the Herrera admin-
istration had the Central Bank seize nearly $5 billion of PDVSA's
financial reserves to help the government make its debt payments. The
move challenged the publicly owned company's traditional managerial
autonomy.
In the 1983 presidential election campaign, AD challenger Jaime
Lusinchi won the presidency primarily by criticizing the economic down-
turn under Herrera. His somewhat successful efforts to reschedule Vene-
zuela's debt and to reactivate the economy ran headlong into a second
major drop in oil prices (crude oil prices fell by 50 percent during 1986).
Lusinchi decided to spend the government's fiscal reserves and borrow
additional funds in an effort to stimulate an economic recovery, spending
relatively freely in 1987 and 1988. This approach helped to spark eco-
nomic growth after the oil price drop, but left an empty treasury to his
successor. The government deficit in 1988 equaled nearly 10 percent of
GDP.1 0
Although AD and COPEI continued to receive between 85 and 90 per-
cent of the vote in the 1978, 1983, and 1988 presidential elections, calls for
change among voices outside these two parties had become louder and
louder as the 1980s progressed."1 In addition to a focus on corruption
this form of pacted democracy and its value as a model for other countries may
become clear only when the oil money begins to disappear."
10. UN ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,
[ECLAC], Balance preliminary de la economfa de America Latina y el Caribe
1994 (Santiago, Chile: ECLAC 1994).
11. See MICHAEL COPPEDGE, STRONG PARTIES AND LAME DUCKS: PRESIDENTIAL
PARTYARCHY AND FACTIONALISM IN VENEZUELA (1994); RICHARD S. HILLMAN,
DEMOCRACY FOR THE PRIVILEGED: CRISIS AND TRANSITION IN VENEZUELA
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and rising concern over the electoral process, critics of the two major par-
ties in the 1980s noted that conditions for impoverished Venezuelans had
not improved much even during the oil boom. For example, despite the
rise in social spending during P6rez's presidency in the 1970s, conditions
for the poorest two-fifths of the population had improved minimally and
income inequality worsened.
C. THE TUMULTUOUS PURSUIT OF MARKET-ORIENTED
REFORM (1989-1998)
Carlos Andr6s P6rez won the 1988 presidential election with a nostal-
gic political campaign in which the veteran politician recalled many
events from his presidency in the 1970s, when oil prices were booming.
He noted that the country faced great challenges but promised to use his
experience to raise wages and to spark an economic recovery. Similar to
Carlos Menem's victorious populist campaign in the May 1989 presiden-
tial election in Argentina, however, P6rez did not inherit the economic
resources necessary to implement the state capitalist economic approach
that their respective speeches evoked.
After his victory in the 1988 election, Carlos Andr6s P6rez inherited
serious economic and political problems. The Venezuelan government
could obtain financing only at exorbitant rates of interest and foreign ex-
change reserves were not sufficient to meet existing debt obligations that
would come due during P6rez's second presidency. While some saw a
shift toward market capitalism as a way to solve these problems, others
viewed the shift away from state capitalism as undesirable. The debate
over political reform also proved increasingly divisive. For three decades,
Venezuela had enjoyed a level of democratic stability in an era character-
ized by military rule in much of Latin America. Over time, however,
concerns multiplied that AD and COPEI were maintaining their electoral
dominance through a combustible mix of clientelism, corruption, and
electoral fraud.
This combination of worsening economic and political conditions
presented Carlos Andr6s P6rez with governance challenges that he had
not faced during the 1970s oil boom. In his first presidency, AD con-
trolled a majority in the legislature and P6rez used rising oil revenues to
dampen opposition and to extend his political support. In 1988, AD fell
just short of controlling a legislative majority and P6rez would need to
devise new governing strategies that did not rely as heavily on oil profits.
As time went on, it became clear that a significant bloc in his own AD
party would not support his plans for market-oriented reform.
12
Two weeks after his early February 1989 inauguration, Carlos Andr6s
P6rez announced a market-oriented economic plan that he labeled el
(1994); REINVENTING LEGITIMACY: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN
VENEZUELA (Damarys Canache & Michael R. Kulisheck eds., 1998).
12. JAVIER CORRALES, PRESIDENTS WITHOUT PARTIES: THE POLITICS OF REFORM IN
ARGENTINA AND VENEZUELA IN THE 1990s (2002).
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viraje [the great turnaround], which most Venezuelans tended to refer to
as "the package." The government announced an end to most price con-
trols and government subsidies, varied plans to freeze salaries and cut
government spending, and a currency devaluation. On February 27, 1989,
buses in Caracas raised their fares, several in excess of the announced
price hike. Some poor Venezuelans who, like most low-income Latin
Americans, tend to bring exact change for traveling to work by bus, re-
acted angrily. In several situations, people turned buses over and burned
them. As police responded to these incidents, hundreds of other people
began looting businesses in a wave of violence that spread to many areas
of the capital. When P6rez declared a state of siege and called in the
military, hundreds of people died. These so-called caracazo disturbances
dramatized the level of popular frustration with Venezuela's worsening
economic conditions in 1989. By year's end, the economy had shrunk by
nearly 8 percent and inflation doubled to an annual rate of 81 percent. 13
P6rez's turn to market capitalism and his use of force to restore order
cost him support among many poor Venezuelans who had voted for him
in December 1988 as a potential national savior.
The P6rez administration held firm, though, to its plans for market-
oriented reform.' 4 The average tariff dropped by three-fifths, and the
government eliminated nontariff barriers on most manufactured goods.
P6rez overhauled the tax system by introducing a value-added tax that
increased government revenues but also raised the level of taxation on
low-income citizens. Restrictions on foreign investment fell by the way-
side and the government announced an ambitious privatization program.
By 1991, the government sold the national airline, the telephone com-
pany, several public banks, and additional firms. It then announced plans
to sell most remaining public utilities and a wide variety of manufacturing
firms. Economic growth resumed in 1990 and 1991, but much of the re-
covery could be attributed to the doubling of oil prices associated with
the Persian Gulf War. The brief oil boom did little to improve conditions
for most low-income citizens. Pdrez continued to find it difficult to build
public support for his adoption of market-capitalist economic policies.
Instead, Venezuelans' perspectives were closely tied to their socioeco-
nomic status: the lower one's income, the more likely one would support
government intervention in the economy. During the P6rez reform push
from 1989-1991, a majority of low and lower-middle income residents op-
posed the government's neoliberal economic reforms, while a majority of
middle and upper-income residents supported the program. 15
13. UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean [ECLAC],
CEPALSTAT online database, http://www.eclac.org/estadisticas/bases/default.asp?
idioma=in (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
14. See MoIsEs NAIM, PAPER TIGERS AND MINOTAURS: THE POLITICS OF VENE-
ZUELA'S ECONOMIC REFORMS (1993).
15. See Kenneth Roberts, Social Polarization and the Populist Resurgence in Vene-
zuela, in VENEZUELAN POLITICS IN THE CHAVEZ ERA: CLASS, POLARIZATION &
CONFLICT 64 (Steve Ellner & Daniel Hellinger eds., 2003).
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Into this difficult scenario stepped a military lodge called the
Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement 200 (MBR-200) [Movimiento
Bolivariano Revolucionario 200]. These young officers (many of them
from low-income and lower-middle-income families) discussed public af-
fairs in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America. As Latin America's
lost decade of the 1980s took its toll on the Venezuelan economy, the
officers' discontent grew, especially when the government turned toward
market capitalism in 1989. When President Carlos Andr6s P6rez ordered
the military to restore order amid widespread looting in Caracas during
late February 1989, some MBR-200 members asked themselves if they
had used force against the wrong side.16
In early 1992, when the return of economic growth did not seem to
reduce poverty or inequality, the MBR-200 launched a coup against the
P6rez government on the evening of February 3, 1992. The rebels did not
achieve their initial objective of arresting the president, nor did they seem
to have the support of the military high command. By 9 a.m. on February
4, 1992, one of the leaders of the coup attempt, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo
Chivez, surrendered and received television time to ask other rebels to
stand down and avoid bloodshed. Chdvez took full responsibility for the
coup and characterized his actions as a pursuit of national interests that
had failed-"for now."
Chdvez's 178-word address made him a symbol of many citizens' grow-
ing rejection of the political and socioeconomic order. On March 10,
many Caracas residents participated in a pot-banging march (cacerolazo)
demanding P6rez's resignation and shouting, "Long live Chdvez!" While
ChAvez served a prison sentence for sedition, some poor Venezuelans be-
gan to wear red paratrooper berets in solidarity with his cause, and wrote
folk songs, graffiti, and poems praising him.
In the months that followed, P6rez's support continued to decline. In
early November 1992, a COPEI proposal to shorten his term was blocked
by AD opposition in the Senate. On November 27, 1992, a second coup
attempt failed amid considerable fighting among all three military
branches; a few hundred people died in the rebellion. Not surprisingly,
the AD candidates in state and local elections in December did poorly.
P6rez tried to reverse his fortunes and clear the air by proposing a consti-
tutional convention. The legislature rejected this proposal in early March
1993. A few days later, the Supreme Court accepted allegations from the
center-left Causa R party that charged P6rez with the illegal diversion of
government funds into the political campaigns of governing parties in Bo-
livia, Haiti, and Nicaragua. With Perez's approval rating in public-opin-
ion polls standing at less than 10 percent, the legislature moved swiftly to
16. For more discussion on the formation of the MBR and of civil-military relations
more broadly, see HAROLD A. TRINKUNAS, CRAFTING CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE
MILITARY IN VENEZUELA: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2005) and CRISTINA
MARCANO & ALBERTO BARRERA TYSZKA, HUGO CHAVEZ SIN UNIFORME: UNA
HISTORIA PERSONAL (Kristina Cordero trans., 2007).
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investigate the matter and began impeachment proceedings by midyear.
Congress removed P6rez from office on August 31 and made veteran AD
senator Ram6n Velizquez the interim president until P6rez's term ex-
pired in February 1994.17
Rafael Caldera, the COPEI founder who had served as president of
Venezuela from 1969-1974, had been one of the few established politi-
cians in the early 1990s who sharply criticized the two major political par-
ties. He cited their failures as the primary motivator for the February
1992 military coup attempt. In the next legislative session after the inci-
dent, he addressed Congress: "It is difficult to ask the people to burn for
freedom and democracy while they think freedom and democracy are not
able to feed them and impede the exorbitant increase in the cost of sub-
sistence; when it has not been able to deal effectively with the blight of
corruption. ' 18
Caldera followed this rhetorical rupture with the two traditional politi-
cal parties with a more tangible break when he left the COPEI party that
he had founded forty-seven years earlier. Caldera ran as the presidential
candidate of the Convergencia [Convergence] coalition of many small po-
litical parties. He also enjoyed the support of the largest party on the
political left, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) [Movement Toward
Socialism]. On the campaign trail, Rafael Caldera criticized the move
toward market-oriented policies under P6rez's second presidency.
Once in office, Caldera initially attempted to return to a state capitalist
model. He halted plans for many privatizations and slowed the pace of
further tariff reduction. In June 1994, Caldera issued a decree in which
he suspended five basic liberties, including the right to private property,
the right to receive compensation for property expropriated by the state,
and the right to pursue profitable activities. He claimed these powers in
the name of an economic emergency. When the Venezuelan Congress
overturned the decree, he issued a new decree that addressed the specific
issue raised by Congress, but reinstituted the suspension of these consti-
tutionally entrenched rights. Caldera used this authority to regulate
prices, control the movement of foreign currencies, and to restructure
wobbly banks in the financial system (the country's second largest bank
failed just before his inauguration). Although Congress relented in this
matter, Caldera could not build majority support for a restructuring of
the tax system to put government services on a more secure financial
footing. While Caldera's state capitalist efforts initially lowered inflation
and restored economic growth, the economy reentered a recession by
17. For an insider's account of the P6rez government's economic reform efforts, see
NAIM, supra note 10. Additional analyses of the politics of reform in Venezuela in
this period include CORRALES, supra note 9, and KURT WEYLAND, THE POLITICS
OF MARKET REFORM IN FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, PERU,
AND VENEZUELA (2002).
18. Daniel Hellinger, Political Overview: The Breakdown of Puntofijismo and the Rise
of Chavismo, in VENEZUELAN POLITICS IN THE CHAVEZ ERA: CLASS, POLARIZA-
TION & CONFLICT 27, 32 (Steve Ellner & Daniel Hellinger eds., 2003).
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1996 and inflation surpassed triple digits for the first time in the modern
Venezuelan history.
As Venezuela's economic fortunes worsened, Caldera changed course
and approved a traditional, market-oriented stabilization policy in April
1996 as part of a loan agreement signed with the IMF. To make this pol-
icy shift more palatable politically, Caldera chose an unusual messenger
to serve as his economic minister, Teodoro Petkoff. Petkoff had spent his
entire life as a leftist political activist associated with MAS and as a jour-
nalist. Petkoff became the face of these market-oriented reforms includ-
ing budget cuts, tariff reductions, devaluation, an end to the prior
investment and exchange controls, and a promise to earmark revenues
for the repayment of outstanding foreign debt. The economy recovered
in 1997, only to stagnate in 1998 as oil prices fell yet again, losing one-
third of their value. Erratic economic performance under Caldera's gov-
ernment made poverty reduction difficult. The poverty rate fell slightly
below 1994 levels in the middle of Caldera's term and back above that
level by the end of his term.
In a decade of stop-and-go attempts at market-oriented economic re-
form, neither P6rez nor Caldera built broad public support for market
capitalism. In 1995, amid Caldera's return to some state capitalist mea-
sures, both lower and middle class Venezuelans supported government
intervention in the economy. After the disappointing economic out-
comes that followed Caldera's 1996 adoption of the Agenda Venezuela set
of market-oriented reforms, by 1998 a healthy majority of over 80 percent
of all socioeconomic classes, including the upper class, expressed support
for government intervention in the economy. 19 As Venezuela headed to-
ward new presidential elections in December 1998, most Venezuelans
found themselves light years away from the historical peak of prosperity
that Venezuela enjoyed in 1980.
D. HUGO CHAVEZ: FROM REFORM FATIGUE TOWARD TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY SOCIALISM (1999-2007)
Hugo Chivez's 1998 campaign speeches on economic policy did not
advocate socialism but rather a restoration of the state capitalist model.
He called for "as much state as necessary and as much market as possi-
ble. ' '20 Once in office, he reviewed the legal framework for recently
privatized economic sectors and tried to reduce tax evasion to increase
funds available for poverty reduction. His Bolivar Plan 2000 called for
the armed forces to assist other government agencies to improve the pro-
vision of health care, sanitation, transportation, housing, and poverty re-
lief. Chdvez also restored the long-running government standard for
19. Damarys Canache, Social Polarization and the Populist Resurgence in Venezuela, in
THE UNRAVELING OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA 32 (Jennifer
L. McCoy & David J. Myers eds., 2004).
20. Ludmila Vinogradoff, Asumi6 Chdvez y pidi6 poderes especiales, CLARIN, Feb. 3,
1999, available at http://www.clarin.com/diario/1999/02/03/i-02801d.htm.
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severance pay that had been eliminated under the Caldera government in
1997. Amid rumors among his opponents that Chivez planned to lead
Venezuela toward a socialist economy, investors reacted cautiously. Cat-
astrophic flooding in December 1999 caused enormous property damage,
which along with low oil prices, helped to shrink the economy by 7 per-
cent in 1999.
ChAvez then turned his attention to reforming the oil sector abroad and
at home. The Venezuelan government successfully pushed OPEC for
production cutbacks that helped raise world crude oil prices by over 50
percent in 2000. The government then set its sights on reforming the na-
tional oil company, PDVSA. From the 1980s onward, PDVSA executives
had reduced their tax obligation via manipulation of the royalty formula
and clever use of their foreign subsidiaries (most notably, their ownership
of CITGO in the United States). PDVSA's activity made up four-fifths
of all national exports, two-fifths of government revenues, and one-fourth
of the GDP. To increase government revenues, ChAvez proposed to re-
vise the formula for royalty and taxation payments. From the 1976 na-
tionalization through 1990, PDVSA consistently paid the government
around 70 percent of its gross income. However, following the emer-
gence of a more market-oriented environment at home and abroad,
PDVSA executives took advantage of both its growing internationaliza-
tion and the new policy context to steadily lower their firm's fiscal bur-
den. As a result, in 2000 they paid only thirty-nine cents on the dollar to
the government. The Chdvez government responded by backing a new
hydrocarbons law (eventually passed in 2001) that revised taxation and
royalty calculations. 21
ChAvez then received economic decree powers for one year beginning
in November 2000. During this period, he issued forty-nine decree laws.
Many of the decree laws regulated elements of all three economic sectors,
agriculture, manufacturing, and services, in ways that gave advantages to
small farmers, small fishing interests, small manufacturing firms, and
small retail businesses. A new hydrocarbons law doubled royalty pay-
ments, although it also conceded a nearly 50 percent reduction in the
highest income-tax rate relevant to the sector. Additionally, a new land
reform program was put in place, aimed at reducing ownership inequality
in an agricultural sector in which 3 percent of the owners controlled 70
percent of all agricultural land. ChAvez's program set a maximum farm
size that varied according to productivity. Farmers who used less than 80
21. For a concise yet detailed treatment of the paradoxical reduction of the govern-
ment's share of oil revenues in the post-nationalization period of the 1980s and the
1990s as well as the Chivez government's response to this issue, see Bernard
Mommer, Subversive Oil, in VENEZUELAN POLITICS IN THE CHAVEZ ERA: CLASS,
POLARIZATION & CONFLICT 131, 131-45 (Steve Ellner & Daniel Hellinger eds.,
2003). For more historical perspective, see TUGWELL, THE POLITICS OF OIL IN
VENEZUELA, supra note 6; JORGE SALAZAR-CARRILLO & BERNADETTE WEST,
OIL AND DEVELOPMENT IN VENEZUELA IN THE 20TH CENTURY (2004).
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percent of their land faced fines and, under certain conditions, potential
expropriation.
Many propertied Venezuelans criticized Chivez's economic program.
In this contentious debate over economic policy, PDVSA executives tried
to reverse several reforms, and oil workers went on strike in April 2002.
Chivez then fired seven members of the PDVSA board. This conflict
spread as the major business and labor confederations launched strikes
and protests. The protests culminated in Chivez's temporary removal in
a military coup later that month. After a matter of days, however, mas-
sive popular mobilizations, international diplomatic pressure, and the un-
popular hamfisted measures decreed by the interim government in its
first hours (which included the summary dissolution of the new 1999 con-
stitution, the legislature, and the supreme court) motivated the military to
restore Ch~ivez to the presidency.
The events of April 2002 did not end conflict over economic policy. In
early December, oil executives and oil workers went back on strike. Ship
captains anchored their tankers at sea, oil well supervisors took their
wells offline, and most PDVSA activity ground to a halt. The strikers
called for Chivez's immediate resignation. Several business owners in
comfortable Caracas neighborhoods launched a sympathy strike, but
most employees and managers in the national economy kept working.
Nonetheless, given the centrality of oil to the Venezuelan economy, the
ten-week "resign now" strike cost the Venezuelan government millions of
dollars in tax revenues and precipitated a nationwide recession. A bitter
Chivez government fired one-third of PDVSA's employees. The oil
strike ended in February 2003 when the opposition agreed to a recall
election aimed at ending Chdvez's presidency. It then took several
months to get oil production back to prestrike levels. The GDP shrank
by 9 percent in 2002 and by another 8 percent in 2003.22
The end of the oil strike in Venezuela coincided with a dramatic (and
sustained) upswing in global crude oil prices. The basket price averaged
across all OPEC producers had stayed between $23 and $28 per barrel
during 2000-2003.23 Then, in 2004, OPEC crude prices rose to $36 per
barrel and kept on increasing; by 2007 the OPEC basket cost $69 a bar-
rel.24 Rising world oil prices spurred a boom in Venezuela as GDP grew
by an annual average of over 11 percent during 2004-2007.25 Economic
growth and an increase in social spending during the Chivez era from 9
percent of GDP in the late 1990s to over 11 percent during the years
22. UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean [ECLAC],
CEPALSTAT online database, http://www.eclac.org/estadisticas/bases/default.asp?
idioma=in (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
23. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], Reference Prices -
OPEC Basket Price, http://www.opec.org/home/basket.aspx (last visited Mar. 15,
2008).
24. Id.
25. UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean [ECLAC],
CEPALSTAT online database, http://www.eclac.org/estadisticas/bases/default.asp?
idioma=in (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
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2000-2005 fueled a reduction in poverty. 26 The poverty rate had wors-
ened dramatically during the initial implementation of the economic
opening during the early 1990s, rising from 40 percent in 1990 to 48 per-
cent in 1994, and not dropping in the ten years that followed.27 Economic
recovery and increased social spending during the 2004-2007 oil boom
did decrease the poverty rate from 49 percent in 2002 down to 37 percent
in 2005, and then to 30 percent by 2006.28
The oil boom, coupled with Chivez's domestic political triumphs in the
2004 recall election, the 2005 legislative elections, and the December 2006
presidential campaign, emboldened the Venezuelan government. After
his reelection, Chivez spoke frequently about a new stage in his
Bolivarian Revolution in which Venezuela would develop what he called
a "twenty-first century socialism." After Chdivez began his new term in
January 2007, he asked the National Assembly to grant him the power to
legislate by decree for eighteen months to pursue reforms in eleven stra-
tegic areas including defense, education, the judiciary, telecommunica-
tions, and the energy sector. After the legislature delegated its authority
over these areas in late January, Chdivez presented plans to renationalize
both telecommunications and the exploration of oil and natural gas. In
March 2007, Chdvez formally announced plans to merge his main politi-
cal party and its smaller, allied parties into a single party by the year's
end, the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) [United Socialist
Party of Venezuela]. Chdvez placed his new vice president, Jorge Rodrf-
guez, in charge of the formation of the new party with the goal of recruit-
ing five million members. By May 2007 Rodriguez announced that
PSUV had over 3.2 million candidates for membership. 29 Soon thereaf-
ter, the smaller allied parties began internal debates about whether to
join the PSUV or not. While ChAvez, Rodriguez, and other government
officials sometimes spoke of continuing respect for different opinions as a
central aspect of their vision for a new socialism, at other moments they
emphasized the need for revolutionary unity and opposition to the gov-
ernment as unpatriotic. When the Supreme Tribunal of Justice permitted
the May 2007 replacement of the only nationwide private television net-
work (RCTV) with a new government-run channel (TVES), large street
demonstrations followed in which anti-Chdvez groups criticized the
court's ruling, while pro-Chivez groups celebrated what they termed the
closure of a destabilizing, anti-government channel.
It was in this climate that Venezuelans were called to the polls in early
December 2007 to vote on a package of sixty-nine constitutional reforms
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. CEPAL, PANORAMA SOCIAL DE AMtRICA LATINA 2007 (2007), translated in Eco-
NOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, [ECLAC], Social
Panorama of Latin America, 2007 (2007), available at http://www.eclac.org/
publicaciones/xml/9/30309/PS12007 SintesisLanzamiento.pdf.
29. Posting of Ricardo to eBlogger, PSUV: 3 milliones 200 mil "por el buche" (May 22,
2007), http://psuv.blogspot.com/2007/05/psuv-3-millones-200-mil-por-el-buche.
html.
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that had been endorsed by Chivez and by a National Assembly domi-
nated by his supporters. The proposed reforms included the elimination
of term limits for the presidency (but not for other offices), a reduction in
the autonomy of the Central Bank and subnational governments, a reduc-
tion in the minimum voting age from eighteen to sixteen years, a decrease
in the maximum working day from eight to six hours, and the incorpora-
tion of informal workers into the social security system. Chdvez's govern-
ment backed these changes as essential elements of the pursuit of twenty-
first-century socialism while his opponents labeled it the end of capitalism
and of democracy in Venezuela. In the end, the constitutional referen-
dum was narrowly defeated by a vote of 51 percent against and 49 per-
cent in favor, amid the lowest voter turnout of the Chdivez era for a
national election. Chdivez's opponents celebrated his government's first
electoral defeat, while Chdivez himself called for 2008 to become a year of
"revision, rectification, and renewed impetus" for his movement.
E. OBSTACLES TO MARKET-ORIENTED REFORM IN
CONTEMPORARY VENEZUELA
The two presidents who preceded Chdvez largely supported the mar-
ket-oriented agenda that Ch~ivez has opposed with increasing vigor over
the course of his presidency. What factors blocked the consolidation of
the market-oriented approach in Venezuela? Four major causal factors
will be emphasized here: the declining legitimacy of the Venezuelan polit-
ical system during the two decades prior to ChAvez's 1998 run for the
presidency; the lack of a severe economic crisis that might have anchored
support for a shift toward market-centric policies; Venezuela's lackluster
economic performance upon the initial introduction of market-oriented
reforms; and the rhetorical advantages associated with presenting the
FTAA agenda as a U.S.-led initiative. Let us consider each of these ob-
stacles below.
It is essential to view the emergence of Hugo Chivez in Venezuela, and
with that the prospects for market-oriented hemispheric integration,
through the prism of widespread, sustained, and worsening criticism of
traditional political parties over the course of the 1980s and 1990s. While
there is not space in this study to examine the political critique central to
ChAvez's claims for the need to build a more complete democracy, the
increasing corruption of the Punto Fijo regime has been examined by ob-
servers of all ideological stripes. 30 As a result of this atmosphere, the
30. See Damarys Canache, Venezuela: Public Opinion and Protest in a Fragile Democ-
racy, in LATIN AMERICAN PoLITIcs & SOCIETY (Steve Ellner ed., 2002), available
at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa4000/is200210/ai-n9091820; COPPEDGE,
supra note 8; BRIAN F. CRISP, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: THE POWERS
AND INCENTIVES OF VENEZUELAN POLITICIANS AND INTEREST GROUPS (2000);
STEVE ELLNER, RETHINKING VENEZUELAN POLITICS: CLASS, CONFLICT, AND THE
CHAVEZ PHENOMENON (2008); Hellinger, Political Overview: The Breakdown of
Puntofijismo and the Rise of Chavismo, supra note 14; Daniel H. Levine, Goodbye
to Venezuelan Exceptionalism, 36 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFFAIRS
145 (1994), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3688/is /ai-n8733190
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traditional party politicians that called for a shift from state capitalism to
more market-driven strategies faced a very suspicious, if not outright hos-
tile, audience in the 1990s.
To worsen the prospects for building support for the Washington Con-
sensus set of economic reforms, the veteran politicians who led govern-
ments that came to pursue market-oriented reforms (Carlos Andr6s
P6rez and Rafael Caldera) made building popular support for market-
oriented policies more difficult by running successful presidential cam-
paigns that were somewhat critical (P6rez) to stridently critical (Caldera)
of market mechanisms. Weyland has noted that their contemporaries in
two nearby countries (Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alberto Fujimori
in Peru) were able to implement similar U-turns toward the market after
inauguration, yet Menem and Fujimori gained support for themselves
and their policies. 3 1 Weyland argues that the depth of the inflationary
crises in Argentina and Peru generated a more widespread desire for
change. In contrast, Venezuelans had suffered an economic downturn in
the late 1980s but not a sharp stagflationary crisis, much less a hyperinfla-
tionary emergency.
Other analysts have contended that market reformers should press
ahead with or without a visible societal consensus,32 perhaps winning
elections while hiding their true reform intentions. 33 If the reforms bring
desirable results, they will build a consensus; if they do not, no previous
consensus will withstand the negative outcomes. Unfortunately for advo-
cates of market oriented reform in Venezuela, the economic downturn
that followed the market-oriented reforms was sharp and sustained. The
poverty rate worsened dramatically during the initial implementation of
the economic opening, rising from 40 percent in 1990 to 48 percent in
199434 Poverty did not decline during the second half of the 1990s either.
Rather than being viewed as the solution to Venezuela's economic mal-
aise of the 1980s, market capitalism became associated with part of the
problem for many Venezuelans, especially the downtrodden.
The above paragraphs synthesize the political and economic climate
within which Hugo Chvez advocated a people's democracy and criti-
cized the Washington Consensus agenda. It is instructive to pause here to
absorb the rhetorical utility of the term "Washington Consensus" for a
political leader like Hugo Chdvez. Chdivez's speeches have a tendency to
?tag=artBody;coll; MICHAEL MCCAUGHAN, THE BATTLE OF VENEZUELA (2005);
VENEZUELAN DEMOCRACY UNDER STRESS (Jennifer McCoy et al. eds., 1995);
THE UNRAVELING OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA (Jennifer L.
McCoy & David J. Myers eds., 2004).
31. WEYLAND, supra note 13
32. Jeffrey Sachs, Life in the Economic Emergency Room, in THE POLITICAL ECON-
OMY OF POLICY REFORM 503, 503-23 (John Williamson ed., 1994).
33. ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (1991).
34. UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean [ECLAC],
CEPALSTAT online database, http://www.eclac.org/estadisticas/bases/default.asp?
idioma=in (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
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blame Venezuela's ills on its domestic "oligarchy" and on its alliance with
the global "hegemon" the U.S. government. 35 Just as some arch-conserv-
atives in the United States try to sully any initiative associated with gov-
ernment activity as "liberal," the ChAvez government attacks (with
increasingly harsh language over time) the FTAA agenda as a creature of
"hegemonic" U.S. interests that should be rejected without further
thought by patriotic Latin Americans inside and outside of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela.
Yet, at the same time that the Ch~ivez government's predominant rhet-
oric is critical of the FTAA agenda, upon winning the 1998 presidential
election, Hugo Chdvez inherited a complex panorama in which a sizable
number of Venezuelans (and some of its most important trading partners,
including the United States) were committed to the pursuit of regional
and sub-regional free trade. This diverse environment shaped the context
in which Ch~ivez's government would develop its foreign economic
policies.
II. REFLECTIONS ON HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION IN
VENEZUELA UNDER CHAVEZ
The global oil boom during 2004-2007 and the electoral triumphs that
occurred without interruption from 2004 through 2006 did more than fan
Hugo Chdvez's ambitions at home. These favorable conditions also fu-
eled an upswing in his international ambitions: the government amped up
its rhetoric and its activity level on the hemispheric and world stages. 36
This section takes stock of Venezuelan foreign economic policies during
the early twenty-first century.
In staking out positions contrary to the ongoing FTAA negotiations,
the Chivez government pursued a two-track strategy that involved work-
ing with existing sub-regional blocs while also proposing the creation of a
new ALBA bloc as an additional alternative to the FTAA approach.
Over time, these two tracks came into tension with one another as Chi-
vez's rhetoric and actions regarding integration created conflict with
some of his sub-regional partners.
On the more traditional sub-regional track, Chfivez initially supported
greater collaboration and integration between the Andean Community
and Mercosur blocs as a path to building up greater negotiating strength
in the FTAA talks. In December 2004 the members of both blocs de-
clared their intention to form a South American Community of Nations.
In mid-2005, Venezuela declared its intention to become a full member of
Mercosur as part of this larger process of integrating the two blocs. As
35. For historical perspective on the evolution of U.S.-Venezuelan relations, see JANET
KELLY & CARLOS A. ROMERO, THE UNITED STATES AND VENEZUELA: RETHINK-
ING A RELATIONSHIP (2002).
36. For a discussion of the potentially destabilizing aspects of Venezuelan foreign pol-
icy (both in Venezuela and beyond), see Rita Giacalone, The Impact of Neo-Popu-
list Civilian-Military Coalitions on Regional Integration and Democracy: The Case
of Venezuela, 33 J. Pol. & Mil. Soc. 25 (2005).
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noted earlier, in November 2005, Venezuela reached a common bargain-
ing position with Mercosur at the Mar del Plata Summit of the Americas
that highlighted concerns regarding the U.S. government's position on
several points.
During the same period as the start of the world oil boom in 2004, the
Chdivez government also promoted the ALBA concept that he had first
mentioned in a Caribbean summit in 2001. In December 2004 (the same
month in which Venezuela participated in the launch of the South Ameri-
can Community of Nations), Venezuela and Cuba initiated the ALBA by
signing bilateral accords. As an alternative to the FfAA, Chivez pro-
moted ALBA as a model centered on social welfare and mutual assis-
tance rather than on free trade. In 2006, Bolivia joined ALBA under the
newly elected Evo Morales government. In 2007, the inaugurations of
Rafael Correa and Daniel Ortega were followed by the incorporation
into the ALBA bloc of Ecuador and Nicaragua. In early 2008, Dominica
joined ALBA as its first English-speaking member state. All four of Ven-
ezuela's partners in ALBA received a considerable increase in economic
assistance from Venezuela during this period.
Since the Mar del Plata Declaration in late 2005, these two tracks of
integration have come into conflict, as the anti-U.S. posture of the Vene-
zuelan government has dominated Venezuelan integration activities. In
2006, Chivez responded to the negotiation of the U.S.-Colombia Free
Trade Agreement by suspending Venezuela's membership in the AC and
in the G-3 bloc linking Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. That same
year, Venezuela reached an agreement in principle to become a full mem-
ber of Mercosur. However, Venezuela's increasingly frequent adoption
of socialist rhetoric at home and abroad has spawned opposition to the
ratification of its accession to Mercosur. Although it had been assumed
by many analysts that ratification during 2007 was a foregone conclusion,
neither the Brazilian nor the Paraguayan legislature had taken this step as
of May 2008. Critiques of Chivez in these two countries have focused on
his centralization of power at home and his use of the oil windfall to culti-
vate allies abroad.
III. VENEZUELA AND THE FUTURE OF THE
FTAA IN LATIN AMERICA
In considering the prospects for hemispheric integration, it is essential
to clarify the vision of integration at issue. Beyond the contrasting goals
and mechanisms of the FFAA and ALBA projects, there are a myriad of
opinions on the precise course that the free-trade-oriented FTAA and the
international-assistance-centered ALBA systems should take in the short,
medium, and long run. To provide analytic clarity, this concluding section
will focus on the future of the FTAA agenda in Venezuela and in the
Americas more broadly.
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A. THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FTAA IN VENEZUELA
For the immediate future, the prospects for the F-FAA in Venezuela are
meager. Political parties tied to Hugo Chdivez control the legislature
through late 2010 and ChAvez's presidential term runs through early 2013.
Given Chivez's strident and sustained opposition to the FTAA, it is diffi-
cult to envision a series of events that would culminate in a reversal of
that stance.
Accordingly, attention turns to the electoral cycle and toward the push
for constitutional reform. Without a change in the two-term limit for the
presidency, Hugo Chivez cannot be a candidate in the December 2012
presidential election. Had the December 2007 constitutional plebiscite
passed, this prohibition would have been removed and a series of other
amendments would have reduced the space for the opposition at the sub-
national level while increasing the role of the government in the econ-
omy. This raises the question: does the defeat of this set of constitutional
amendments signal the dawn of a new era in Venezuelan political
economy?
One should not rush to judgment in interpreting the results of the De-
cember 2007 referendum as an endorsement of a return to a pre-chavista
economic policy. It is essential to recall that popular discontent with the
centralization of power under the two major parties was a pivotal prelude
to the emergence of the Ch~ivez movement. Given that backdrop, the
decline in voter turnout and the defeat of the referendum may be driven
primarily by a lack of enthusiasm for extending the centralization of au-
thority under Chivez's movement, not by a change in attitudes toward
economic policy. Indeed, the 2007 Latinobar6metro poll (conducted
across eighteen Latin American countries, excluding only Cuba and Ha-
iti) shows an increase in statist attitudes among Venezuelans on two ques-
tions and considerable stability in the other items that examine economic
attitudes. 37 One question asks respondents whether or not they believe
that the state is capable of solving all problems. Venezuelans have been
consistently more statist than Latin America as a whole, and that trend
has deepened over the years 2005-2007. In 1998, 33 percent of the re-
spondents across Latin America felt that the state could solve all
problems, while 46 percent of Venezuelans held this view.38 In 2005, 29
percent of the region's respondents were statist in this sense, while 58
percent of Venezuelans expressed optimism regarding the state's capabili-
ties.39 In 2007, these percentages were 38 percent for Latin America and
67 percent in Venezuela.40 Another question in the poll asks respondents
whether or not they believe that a market economy is best for their coun-
try. In 2002, 62 percent of Venezuelans were market-oriented in this
37. Latinobar6metro, Informe Latinobar6metro 2007 (2007), http://www.latino
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sense, while in 2007 only 49 percent of Venezuelans expressed this view.4 1
The defeat of the 2007 constitutional referendum notwithstanding, the
available data on public attitudes do not support the notion that Venezue-
lans are becoming more market-oriented. Thus, the prospects for a Vene-
zuelan political coalition in support of the FTAA agenda are tied to the
emergence of a different economic and political context. Overreaching
by the Venezuelan state under Chdivez could perhaps produce such a sce-
nario, but it has not done so yet.
B. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE
FTAA IN LATIN AMERICA
That same Latinobar6metro poll provides an important reminder that
the tide of public opinion in Latin America as a whole has shifted away
from market-oriented economics.42 The Venezuelan opinion trends dis-
cussed above are not the exception in Latin America; instead, they form
part of the regional trend. In the 1998 poll, 66 percent of Latin American
respondents expressed the view that the market economy was best for
their respective countries.43 By 2002 this figure had dropped to 59 per-
cent, and by 2007 it fell to 52 percent region-wide. 44 Across all of Latin
America, only Mexico swam against this tide and experienced a statisti-
cally significant upswing in expressed support for market mechanisms
(from 51 percent in 1998 to 60 in 2007). 45 Only two other countries
avoided a statistically significant decline in their respective support for
the market, Colombia and Uruguay. Venezuela joins over four-fifths of
Latin American countries in which support for market mechanisms had
declined visibly over the past decades.
The electoral salience of this shift in economic attitudes is palpable.
Beginning with the victory of Hugo Chdvez in 1998, a majority of Latin
American countries elected presidents from center-left political parties or
from the center-left wing of more ideologically eclectic movements-Chile
in 2000 and 2006; Brazil in 2002 and 2006; Argentina in 2003 and 2007;
Uruguay in 2004; Bolivia in 2005; and Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru in
2006; and Guatemala in 2007. It is no accident that the only two large
Latin American economies led by center-right presidents (Colombia and
Mexico) are the two countries where a large (Colombia) or rising (Mex-
ico) majority of the population expresses support for the market as the
best economic approach.
Yet, regarding the FTAA agenda, it is also important not to overstate
the shift away from the market in Latin America. A slim majority of the
region's citizens continue to favor the market as the best option for their
41. Id.
42. Latinobar6metro, Informe Latinobar6metro 2007 (2007), http://www.latino
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respective countries. Furthermore, the current presidents that have
emerged from Latin America's leftward swing have decidedly diverse ec-
onomic platforms. Some welcome a substantial role for market forces,
while others (like Hugo Chdvez) stridently criticize the market at most
opportunities. And still others position themselves somewhere in the
middle between those two poles. One characteristic, however, is shared
by all of these leaders, a ferocious critique of the inadequacy of the social
safety nets in place when Latin American economies shifted from state
capitalism toward market capitalism during the 1980s and 1990s.
The Pew Global Attitudes Survey of seven Latin American countries
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) sheds
further light on this tension between the potential utility of market mech-
anisms and the desire for social policies designed to protect the vulnera-
ble and the impoverished. 46 This is an issue for pro-market domestic
economic policies, but also for the FTAA initiative. The bold promise of
the free trade approach is the expansion of economic opportunity and
prosperity in the aggregate. During the same years in which support for
market mechanisms as a whole declined in Latin America, the Pew
Global Attitudes Surveys conducted in 2002 and 2007 document stable or
rising majorities showing strongly favorable or somewhat favorable atti-
tudes in support of trade as beneficial in all seven of these countries, in-
cluding Venezuela. In the Pew Surveys, the percentage of the population
supporting "trade as beneficial" exceeded the percentage favoring "free
market economies" in all seven countries by an average of 21 percentage
points.47 Yet, at the same time that citizens welcome trade, even larger
majorities in every country either completely agreed or mostly agreed
with the statement that the government should take care of the very poor.
What are the implications of the above public opinion and electoral
trends for the FTAA agenda? First and foremost, one can see the poten-
tial support for hemispheric free trade. In concept, most Latin Ameri-
cans embrace the idea that trade is beneficial. This has buoyed the
considerable and sustained liberalization of tariff rates in Latin
America.48 In 1985 the average tariff rate was 49 percent, but by 1995 it
had fallen to 13 percent. In 2003 it was 10 percent. 49 Venezuela mirrored
these trends with the average tariff falling from 30 to 13 to 12 percent
over the same period.50 In 2006, following several years in which the eco-
nomic role of the state expanded in Venezuela, the average tariff re-
mained steady at 13 percent.51
46. Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2007 (Oct. 4, 2007), http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/
258.pdf.
47. Id.
48. Eduardo Lora, Trends and Outcomes of Tax Reform, in THE STATE OF STATE RE-
FORM IN LATIN AMERICA 185, 189 (Eduardo Lora ed., 2007).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. World Trade Organization, World Tariff Profiles 2006 44 (2007), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/tariff-profiles06-e.pdf.
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At the same time, a major flashpoint in the FTAA project has been the
lack of a tangible commitment to compensate geographic regions and ec-
onomic sectors that are apt to lose ground initially upon the creation of
an FTAA. As long as the negotiations for the FTAA focus on eliminating
non-tariff barriers in manufacturing and on obstacles to international
banking and investment, rather than on non-tariff barriers in agriculture
and on the enhancement of social safety nets, the FTAA negotiations will
remain vulnerable to strident criticisms from political leaders as diverse
in their economic policies as Hugo Ch~ivez in Venezuela, Luiz Indcio da
Silva in Brazil, and Michelle Bachelet in Chile, to name but a few.
While the rationale for the above recommendation for U.S. policymak-
ers has a clear grounding in the political and economic realities present in
Venezuela and elsewhere, this recommendation's implementation is diffi-
cult. Indeed, both the need for this revised strategy and the obstacles
toward its pursuit stem from a conceptualization of trade negotiations as
a two-level game in which national governments interact with one an-
other and also with their respective national constituencies.5 2 Just as
Latin American trade negotiators face constraints from their constituents,
U.S. negotiators face strong domestic pressures to pursue various forms
of compensation for the structural imbalance implied by the tariff negoti-
ations. The math of the tariff negotiations is very simple. If the FTAA
were to focus solely on eliminating tariffs, the United States would be
conceding (in static, monetized terms) much more market access than it
would be acquiring. Thus, the domestic calls for FTAA provisions that
would assist U.S. interests regarding trade in services, investment, gov-
ernment procurement, etc. are reinforced by the perception that a free
trade agreement with no additional features could be, in the aggregate, a
loss for the United States in a zero-sum, mathematical assessment of the
FTAA negotiations.
Where does one go from here? From a domestic perspective, the U.S.
insistence on including additional issues in the FTAA is understandable
and difficult to avoid. Indeed, some would argue that a multifaceted
FTAA is beneficial on the whole to the Americas. 53 Yet, from the same
two-level game perspective, it is hard to imagine that a vigorous FTAA
bloc can be formed without additional provisions that would provide re-
gional development funds analogous to those found in the evolution of
the European Union, as it incorporated economies of radically different
52. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT'l Org. 427 (1988); DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL
BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, &
Robert D. Putnam eds., 1993); HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1997);
Genevra Forwood, The Road to Cotonou: Negotiating a Successor to Lom6, 39 J.
COMMON MKT. STUDIES 423-42 (2001); Jeffrey S. Lantis, Leadership Matters: Inter-
national Treaty Ratification in Canada and the United States, 35 AM. REV. CAN.
STUDIES 383 (2005).
53. TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS (Jose M. Salazar-Xirinachs & Maryse
Robert, eds., 2001).
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sizes, levels of diversification, levels of prosperity, and levels of interna-
tional competitiveness. Until U.S. negotiators embrace this inconvenient
truth, the ability of Latin American politicians like Hugo Chdvez to
blackball the FTAA endeavor as an enterprise lacking social solidarity
will remain intact. Similarly, Latin American negotiators need to recog-
nize that an FTAA without some provisions in services, investment, intel-
lectual property, and other issues is unlikely to generate U.S. support.
The creation of a tariff-free hemisphere will become more probable
when parties on all sides support some provisions beyond tariff elimina-
tion than what they respectively prefer not to include in the FTAA. The
initial concept paper in circulation regarding the Fifth Summit of the
Americas planned for 2009 in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago appro-
priately mixes themes of sound macroeconomic policies with language
emphasizing the need for poverty reduction, greater access to health care,
and other issues. 54 It remains to be seen whether the FIAA process can
culminate in an effective compromise between enhancing the role of the
market in some areas while financing a more effective government with
regard to several other issues.
54. Fifth Summit of the Americas, Summit Implementation Review Group, Securing
Our Citizens' Future by Promoting Human Prosperity, Energy Security and Envi-
ronmental Sustainability (2008), http://www.summit-americas.org/V-Summit/CP
19993E04.doc.
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